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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The action was filed by appellant in the District Court of 
Weber County where both parties reside, and where a motor vehicle 
accident occurred. Because the parties were fellow employees at 
the Defense Depot Ogden, and because the accident occurred on the 
premises of their employer, entitling appellant to receive 
Workman's Compensation, which she has received, the Trial Court 
granted respondent's motion for summary judgment finding that the 
exclusive remedy of the appellant against her fellow employee, in 
applying the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, which is identi-
cal in purpose to the Utah Workman's Compensation Act, was receipt 
of Workman's Compensation. The appellant appealed the Trial 
Court's decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, and 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah assigned the matter to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The principal issue of review being sought by the appellant 
is whether the exclusive remedy of Workman's Compensation is 
applicable against fellow employees when one employee is injured 
by another employee on the premises of the employer even though 
they have not yet .punched a time clock, but are proceeding toward 
their work station within the premises of their common employer. 
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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINITIVE 
The Federal Workman's Compensation Statute and Tort Claim 
Statute apply because the accident occurred on a federal installa-
tion where both the appellant and respondent were employed. The 
pertinent portion of the Federal Employee's Compensation Act is 
found in 5 U.S.C. Section 8116, and in the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2679, whose applicable terms are as 
follows: 
"5 U.S.C. §8116 
(c) The liability of the United States or an instrumen-
tality thereof under this sub-chapter or any extension 
thereof with respect to the injury or death of an 
employee is exclusive and instead of all other liability 
of the United States or the instrumentality to the 
employee, his legal representative, spouse, defendants, 
next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to 
recover damages from the United States or the instrumen-
tality because of the injury or death in a direct judi-
cial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admirality, 
or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a 
Workman's Compensation Statute or under a Federal Tort 
Liability Statute. However, this sub-section does not 
apply to a master or a member of a crew vessel. 
28 U.S.C. §2679 
(b) The remedy by suit against the United States as 
provided by Section 1346(b) of this Title for damage to 
property or for personal injury, including death, result-
ing from the operation by any employee of the government 
of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of 
any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the 
same subject matter against the employee or his estate 
whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.11 
Because, as will be shown hereafter, the interpretation of 
the two aforementioned Federal Statutes are in harmony with the 
interpretation given by the Utah Courts to the exclusive remedy 
-3-
statute under the Utah Workmanfs Compensation Law, that exclusive 
remedy statute, namely, Title 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
is hereby set out as follows: 
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to the pro-
visions of this Title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this Act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law 
or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, 
children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of 
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon 
any accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing 
in this Section, however, shall prevent an employee or 
his dependents from filing a claim with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah for compensation in those cases 
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended.11 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case was filed by appellant against the respondent, a 
fellow employee, seeking, in addition to the Workman!s Compensation 
benefits she had received and was receiving, additional and further 
compensation for damages for which she had already been compensated 
by Workman's Compensation. Because of the undisputed facts: that 
appellant and respondent were fellow employees; that the accident 
occurred on the premises of their employer while both were entering 
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their work place; and that the appellant had applied for and 
received Workman's Compensation for those injuries, the respondent 
moved for and was granted summary judgment by the Trial Court 
because Workman's Compensation is the appellant's exclusive remedy, 
and she cannot maintain, in addition thereto, a tort action against 
her fellow employee who allegedly caused her injury for which she 
had already received Workman's Compensation benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTg 
The findings of fact made by the Trial Court, a copy of 
which are attached to the appellant's brief, are not in dispute, 
and were stipulated to by the parties. Synoptically, they are 
that both the appellant and the respondent entered their employer's 
premises through a security gate, traveled within the military 
installation boundaries to the place where they both worked, and 
as both were on their way to their immediate place of employment, 
the respondent's motor vehicle struck the appellant who had just 
exited her car and was walking toward her duty station. While 
neither party had officially "punched in," both were on the 
secured premises of their employer, and were in the immediate 
vicinity of their work station. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Inasmuch as the appellant and the respondent, fellow employ-
ees, were involved in an accident on their employer's premises, on 
which they were traveling incident to their employment, the 
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appellant was entitled to, applied for, and received Workman's 
Compensation benefits in accordance with federal law. The 
applicable Federal Workman's Compensation Law, which is consonant 
with Utah's Workman's Compensation Law mandates the exclusivity of 
the Workman's Compensation as the appellant's sole remedy, and 
precludes an action in tort against the fellow employee who may 
have caused the injury by some act of negligence. The Trial 
Court's summary judgment should, therefore, be sustained. 
ARGUMENTS 
I 
UNDER EITHER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION ACT OR THE 
UTAH WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION ACT, FELLOW EMPLOYEES ARE 
IMMUNE FROM TORT ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE INJURED FELLOW EMPLOYEE 
At the Trial Court level, the appellant argued strenuously 
that Workman's Compensation benefits were not the exclusive remedy 
under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act. Even though that 
argument has now been abandoned in the appellant's brief, cases 
are herein cited for the benefit of the Court for the purpose of 
showing the inter-relationship between the Federal Workman's 
Compensation Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act which must be 
read together in support of the proposition that not only are 
employers immune from suit by employees where they are injured on 
the employer's premises while coming to, leaving, or attending 
work, but also that fellow employees are immune from tort 
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litigation. The same result is achieved under the Federal Statutes 
as is mandated by the Utah Workman1s Compensation Statute. 
While it is true that as originally passed, the Federal 
Employee?s Compensation Act only provided immunity from suit to 
the employer, and not a fellow employee, the Federal Tort Claim^ 
Act, and specifically 28 U.S.C. §2679 was amended and became 
effective on September 21, 1961, and by that amendment to the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, the Federal Courts have ruled that fellow 
employees thereafter enjoyed the same immunity from suit as did 
employers where the injured fellow employee was entitled to 
receive Workman's Compensation benefits. Under the provisions of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, all causes of action involving a 
federal employee must be brought against only the federal 
government, and not against the employee. Three Federal Appeals 
Court cases are representative of the many cases standing for the 
proposition that one federal employee injured when struck by a 
motor vehicle being operated by another federal employee, as is 
the case here, may not sue the fellow employee in either Federal 
or State Court, but has, as his exclusive remedy, Workman's 
Compensation benefits under the Federal Employee's Compensation 
Act. See Vantrease v. United States, 400 F.2d 853 (Sixth Circuit, 
1968); Van Houten v. Ralls, 411 F.2d 940 (Ninth Circuit, 1969); 
and Noga v. United States, 411 F.2d 943 (Ninth Circuit, 1969). In 
Vantrease the Court noted the Trial Court's ruling in Noga and 
-7-
Van Houten and indicated it was the clear intent of Congress in 
passing the amendments to the Tort Claims Act that co-employee 
federal drivers were insulated from lawsuits by injured co-employ-
ees the same as the employer himself where Workman's Compensation 
benefits were payable and paid to the injured employee. In all 
three of those cases, the Federal Appeals Court noted that with 
the enactment of the 1961 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims 
Act, co-employees were to be treated the same as the employer in 
Workman's Compensation situations, and that an injured employee 
could not sue the co-employee who had caused his injury under 
circumstances where Workman's Compensation came into play. 
Because the appellant has now apparently abandoned that 
theory of the case advocated before the Trial Court, no. further 
cases will be cited even though they are legion on the point. 
POINT II 
THE SAME "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" STANDARD SHOULD BE USED 
IN DETERMINING BOTH ENTITLEMENT TO WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS AS WELL AS APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY IMMUNITY OF CO-EMPLOYEES 
It is the appellant's contention in this case that she is 
entitled to receive Workman's Compensation on the one hand because 
she was "within the course of employment" but that respondent, who 
was doing the same thing she was doing was "not in the course of 
employment." While a very minority of the State Courts have 
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adopted such a criteria, namely, South Carolina in 1966 in two 
cases, namely, Williams v, Bebbington, 146 SE 2d 853 (S.C. 1966) 
and McNaughton v. Sims, 147 SE 2d 631 (S.C. 1966), the premise of 
both those decisions is contrary to the already decided law of the 
State of Utah. The State of Utah in Soldier Creek Coal Company v. 
Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985) specifically reaffirmed the 
"Employer1s Premises" rule which had been announced anciently by 
the Court in the Bountiful Brick case. The Court specifically 
held that while you were not within the course of your employment 
while going to or coming from work, you are in the course and 
scope of your employment, and the accident is covered by Workman1s 
Compensation if it occurs on the employer!s premises, even if the 
employee has not yet arrived at his work site or has already left 
the work site. A reading of the two South Carolina cases makes it 
quite clear that South Carolina, unlike Utah, does not subscribe 
to the "Premises Rule." It appears that Texas, California, and 
Nevada have also adopted the same rule as was adopted by South 
Carolina, and allow an employee double recovery by permitting the 
recovery of Workman1s Compensation benfits from the employer and 
also allow a tort action against the fellow employee causing the 
injury. 
Several states, who have adopted the "Premises Rule" as has 
Utah, have dealt with questions almost identical with that involved 
in this case, namely, whether an employee, while on the premises 
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of the employer, while either coming to or going from work is 
injured by the negligence of a fellow employee. The Court of 
Appeals of Illinois in Mast v. Rogers, 254 N.E. 2d 179 (111. 1969) 
were called upon to decide whether one co-employee could sue 
another co-employee for injuries and damages sustained after both 
had left the parking lot of their employer, and were traveling on 
a road owned by their employer. In that case, the appellant con-
tended that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of 
her employment so as to bar her tort action. The appellant also 
took the position that she should not have to accept Workman1s 
Compensation benefits, but should be at liberty to sue her 
co-employee because they were no longer in the course of their 
employment after leaving work and nearly reaching the public 
highway to which the company road led. In sustaining the Trial 
Court's finding that the injury occurred in the course of employ-
ment, the Illinois Court noted as follows: 
"Proof that an employee is present at the place where he 
was injured because of his employment is not by itself 
sufficient to sustain his burden of proving that an 
injury arose out of the employment, but an injury fairly 
traceable to the employment as a contributory proximate 
cause qualifies as having arisen out of the employment. 
(Citing cases) 
"This Court is of the opinion that the injury occurred 
on a road that was provided and used as an incident of 
the employment, the P.E.T. plant-owned road being an 
adjunct of the P.E.T. plant, and that the injury is 
fairly traceable to the employment as a contributing, 
proximate cause; therefore, the injury arose out of the 
employment. 
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!fThe words ! in the course of the employment1 concern the 
time, place, and circumstances of the injury, (citing 
case). The employment contemplates an employee!s entry 
upon and departure from the employer!s premises as much 
as it contemplates his working there. Employment is not 
limited to the exact moments when an employee begins or 
ceases his duties, but necessarily includes a reasonable 
time before commencing and after concluding actual 
employment, (citing case). Such is the situation as it 
existed in this case. 
"We conclude that the plaintiff-employee was still in 
the course of her employment at the time of the acci-
dental injury." 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Eisnaugle 
v. Booth, 226 S.E. 2d 259 (W.Va. 1976) dealt with a case whose fact 
situation was nearly identical with this case. In that case, the 
appellant and the respondent were both employees of the National 
Steele Corporation. They were both on their way to work, and had 
entered the parking lot of their employer. Appellant had parked 
his car in the employer1s private parking lot, which was adjacent 
to his place of employment and was walking to a location where he 
would punch a time card to begin work. While driving his personal 
automobile to park in the same parking area, respondent struck 
appellant and caused the injuries which were the subject matter of 
the lawsuit. 
After setting out the West Virginia Statute, which has the 
same provisions as both the Federal Statute and the Utah Statute 
relative to employers1 and co-employees1 immunity from civil lia-
bility, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held as follows: 
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11
 As a general rule, where an injury is received by an 
employee on the employer's property near his place of 
work while the employee is going to work, such injury is 
deemed to have arisen in the course and as a result of 
his employment. (Citing cases and authorities). This 
familiar exception to the "Going and Coming" Rule is 
articulated in the syllabus announced in Hager v. 
Compensation Commissioner, 112 W. Va. 492, 165 SE 668 
(1932) : 
'Where an employee is accidentally injured upon premises 
owned or controlled by the employer at a point reasonably 
proximate to the place of work, while the employee is 
going to or from his work on a premises route in general 
use by the employees, such injury will be deemed to have 
arisen from and in the course of the employment, within 
the Workman's Compensation Act.' 
"The Virginia case of Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 165 SE 
2d 394 (1969) is almost identical to the case at bar. In 
that case, an employee had parked his automobile in the 
employer's parking lot and, after changing clothes in the 
locker room near the parking lot, was struck by an auto-
mobile of a fellow employee while walking across the 
parking lot to his employment. It was held that the 
injury was received in the course of and as a result of 
his employment, and that the plaintiff's rights and 
remedies were governed exclusively by the provisions of 
the Workman's Compensation Act. Similarly, in the vast 
majority of jurisidictions, the general rule, even in the 
absence of an immunizing statute, is that where an 
employee who is going to or coming from work is injured 
by a fellow employee on the employer's parking lot, the 
injury is received within the course of and as a result 
of employment and defendant co-employee is immune from 
liability for such injury. See, Jackson v. Hutchinson, 
453 SW 2d 269 (Ky. 1970); Threet v. Pinkston, 20 MichT 
App. 39, 173 NW.2d 731 (1970)." 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York, in 
Bagley v. Gilbert, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 737 (New York 1980) dealt with a 
similar question where an employee, who had punched off the clock 
and was leaving the employer's premises for his personal errands 
was sued by another employee still working on the premises. In 
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that case, the injured party argued that the defendant was not "in 
the same employ11 because he had punched out and was beginning to 
leave the premises for lunch, which took him out of the course of 
employment. The injured party further argued that because of a 
violation of a company policy concerning the use of a private 
automobile in a certain part of the employer's premises, there 
were further grounds for making the employee leaving the premises 
subject to personal liability. The Court ruled that the injured 
party's only right of recovery was for Workman's Compensation, and 
that even though the defendant had punched out and was leaving 
work and was using his car in an area of the employer's premises 
that he should not have been using the car made no difference. 
They held that Workman's Compensation was the exclusive remedy to 
the injured party, and precluded him from maintaining the negli-
gence action. 
Professor Larsen, who was cited as the authority in the 
Solider Creek Coal case for the "Premises Rule" has suggested in 
the same treatise, namely, Larsen, The Law of Workman's 
Compensation, at Section 72.22 the solution to the pertinent 
issue of this appeal. In that part of his treatise, he is dealing 
with the immunity of employers and co-employees under Workman's 
Compensation, and is specifically dealing with the question of 
whether the co-employee is acting in the course of his employment. 
He first asks two questions, namely: 
-13-
"The commonest question that arises in these cases is: 
Which test of 'course of employment1 applies? Is it the 
Workman's Compensation test, or the vicarious liability 
test?" 
He then discusses the cases relied upon by the appellant in 
support of the proposition that you should apply two different 
tests, so as to entitle an injured party to a double recovery, 
namely, Workman's Compensation from the employer, and tort liabil-
ity from the co-employee, and then concludes with the observation 
that: 
"The more satisfactory test, unless expressly ruled out 
by statute, is that adopted by New Jersey and the major-
ity of states that have confronted the issue, which 
simply uses the regular Workman's Compensation course of 
employment standard for this purpose. After all, there 
are complications enough administering one course of 
employment test under the act, without adding a second. 
By adopting the compensation test, a Court has at hand a 
ready made body of cases with which to dispose of most 
boarder line situations." 
Professor Larsen cites the New Jersey case of Konitch v. 
Hartung, 81 N.J. super. 376, 195 A.2d 649 (1963), and also 
Eisnaugle v. Booth, 226 S.E. 2d 259 (W. Va. 1976). 
In Konitch, the New Jersey Court was dealing with a fact 
situation almost identical to the fact situation in this case. 
There, the plaintiff drove her car into her employer's parking 
lot, and after parking it, started to walk toward the exit from 
the parking lot in order to get to the office where she worked. 
While she was still inside the parking lot, she was struck and 
injured by an automobile operated by defendant, who was driving to 
work and was about to park his car. It was then the defendant's 
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intention to walk to his work station as the plaintiff was doing 
at the time of the accident. After citing the applicable New 
Jersey Workman1s Compensation Statute relative to the Workman1s 
Compensation being the exclusive remedy as against the employer 
and the fellow employee, which is almost identical to both the 
Utah and the Federal Exclusivity Provision, the Court framed the 
issue before them as follows: 
"We have here a case where the injured plaintiff and 
defendant are employed by the same employer. Both were 
at the parking lot for the purpose of beginning their 
work day. Although defendant has the use of the com-
pany's motor vehicle for pleasure as well as business, 
at the time of the accident, his sole reason for operat-
ing the vehicle was to get to work." 
In that case, the plaintiff argued that not only must 
the parties be employed by the same employer, but that the 
co-employee must commit the tort while performing a duty and 
function of his employment. In rejecting that argument, the 
Court cited Professor Larsen's treatise on Workman's 
Compensation Law, holding basically that: 
"*** The test, therefore, is not that the co-employee 
should have been acting under an employment duty, but 
rather in the course of his employment. 
"There can be no question that when defendant drove to 
work and entered the parking lot provided by the company, 
he was in the course of employment. An accident arises 
1
 in the course of employment' when it occurs within the 
period of employment and at a place where the employee 
may reasonably be. (Citing Larsen) Our Courts have 
held that the employer's parking lot is part of the 
employment premises, and an employee entering or using 
the lot in the circumstances here present is in the 
course of employment. (Citing cases)'* 
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Th e Supreme Court of Kansas, in facing a similar question, 
reached the same result, but under a little different mechanism. 
They have adopted, as a criteria for the "Exclusive Remedy'1 test a 
criteria where you look at both co-employees, and if the allegedly 
negligent co-employee would be entitled to receive Workman1s 
Compensation if he were injured in the same accident, and the 
injured co-employee is also entitled to receive compensation in the 
same accident, then the exclusive remedy provision of the Workman1s 
Compensation Act gives immunity from suit to the negligent 
co-employee. 
In Blank v. Chawla, 678 P.2d 162 (Kan. 1984) the plaintiff 
filed an action against the defendant after he was struck by an 
automobile operated by defendant, a fellow employee, as he was 
walking in the employer's parking lot. Both employees had finished 
their work at the time of the accident, and were walking and driv-
ing respectively through the parking lot. It was plaintiff1s con-
tention that because defendant was no longer doing the work of his 
employer, but was leaving the employer's parking lot after his 
work day, that he was not in the course of his employment, and was 
not, therefore, a co-employee. The Kansas Court adopted the same 
"Premises Rule" as has Utah and'most other states, and allows the 
payment of Workman's Compensation benefits to any employee injured 
while on the premises of the employer, even though the injury 
occurs either before they have officially commenced work after 
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punching a time clock, or after leaving work and punching out. In 
ruling that Workman's Compensation was the plaintiff's exclusive 
remedy, because both the plaintiff and the defendant would have 
been entitled to Workman's Compensation had they both been injured 
in the same accident, the Court stated: 
"Here, had Chawla been injured in the same accident, 
under the same circumstances, he would have been 
entitled to recover under the Workman's Compensation 
Act. In an action for damages by an injured party 
against his co-employee in which the Exclusive Remedy 
Provision of the Workman's Compensation Act is asserted 
as a defense, it is held: (1) A co-employee is immune 
only if he or she would have been entitled to receive 
Workman's Compensation had she or he been injured in the 
same accident; and (2) Since no genuine issue of mater-
ial fact remains to be resolved, the Trial Court did not 
err in granting summary judgment." 
It really does not matter which of the various state tests 
you apply, considering the difference of approach between the 
Courts of Kansas, New Jersey, West Virginia, New York, Michigan, 
Kentucky, or Virginia, you come to the same result in this case, 
because under any of those varying tests, in light of Utah's 
"Premises Rule" the appellant and the respondent were co-employees 
at the time of the accident, and were functioning on their employ-
er's property incident to their employment with their common 
employer. 
The appellant's justification for receiving double compen-
sation for the injury is flawed. The law has recognized repeatedly 
the role of the no-fault concept of compensation in both the work 
-17-
place, the less serious automobile accident injury cases, and 
overtures are being made in other areas, such as products liabil-
ity and medical malpractice. The argument made by appellant that 
Workman's Compensation is an inadequate remedy for injured indivi-
duals because it fails to provide damages for either pain and 
suffering or loss of earning capacity is not only a misstatement, 
but is immaterial. You get what you get under Workman's 
Compensation, No-Fault, and the like as is mandated by statute. 
The appellant is no worse off and no better off in the receipt of 
Workman's Compensation benefits by the fact she was injured in the 
parking lot as she neared her work station than she would have 
been had the time clock fallen on her and caused the same injury 
immediately after she punched in. Also, she is compensated for 
her loss of earning capacity assuming she has suffered a loss of 
earning capacity. Not only does she receive payment of her medi-
cal costs, and loss of income actually incurred, if she has sus-
tained a permanent partial disability of some type, she is also 
entitled to compensation for that, which is in fact compensation 
for loss of earning capacity. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant was injured by a co-employee while on the secured 
premises of their employer incident to the employment of both the 
appellant and the respondent. Under both Federal Workman's 
Compensation Law and State Workman's Compensation Law, her exclu-
sive remedy against not only her employer, but also her fellow 
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employee, is Workman's Compensation benefits. To hold otherwise 
would be to totally disregard the "Premises Rule11 which was 
reaffirmed as the law of this jurisdiction as recently as 1985, 
and would result in a double recovery to the appellant, allowing 
her to receive Workman's Compensation benefits under one standard 
of course and scope of employment, but to be able to sue her 
co-employee under another standard of course and scope of 
employment. 
The Trial Court's judgment entered on stipulated facts 
should be affirmed. 
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